Although I am aware of the distinction between deduction and induction in logic, which relies on the strength of the link between premises and conclusion, with deduction a matter of necessity and induction a matter of probability, I find the distinction problematic. For instance, the argument "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So, Socrates is a mortal" is a classic example of a deductive argument. But the first premise is based on particular cases, so it cannot be universally guaranteed that it would be always true. But the fact that it may not always be true makes it one of probability and not necessity. Would this consideration make a difference as to the argument is deductive or inductive?
I am reading "The Philosopher's Toolkit" by Baggily and Fosl, and in section 1.12 is the following: "As it turns out, all valid arguments can be restated as tautologies - that is, hypothetical statements in which the antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and the conclusion."
My understanding is the truth table for a tautology must yield a value of true for ALL combinations of true and false of its variables. I don't understand how all valid arguments can be stated as a tautology. The requirement for validity is the conclusion MUST be true when all the premises are true.
I must be missing something.
Thanx - Charlie
I seem to remember there was a medieval philosopher--maybe Russell mentions him in his History of Western Philosophy--who talked about peer influence or what a social scientist today might call regression toward the mean. He advised that, to live a saintly life, one should surround oneself with saintly people. Who was he? Did he write anything available today? Any pithy quotes?
Does the identity of indiscernibles principle indicate that, for example, a person with N number of hairs, who then loses a hair, is not identical to the person with N -1 number of hairs? Unless I'm mistaken the principle is basically that entities having all of their properties in common are identical entities, but is it also true that two entities not having all of their properties in common (like Bill with N hairs and Bill with N -1 hairs) are not identical? Can entities with different properties nevertheless be identical? If so, how can we determine that Bill and Sally aren't identical, since merely not having all of their properties in common does not exclude the possibility of identity?
I've recently been struggling with the idea of Fatalism, Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarianism, etc., and from what I've been reading, the general consensus is compatibilism among most philosophers.
If this is the case, then what sense is there in being proud of myself for anything good I do? Is there such thing as effort in my life, or am I just on an inevitable and programmed path?
Truth is, I'm an artist.
Online, I prefer images be sourced, so anyone who appreciates it enough can get to it easily, and credit goes to the artist. I like to believe that the drawings I make and images I create have something respectable behind them, effort, hard work, practice, time, determination, patience, fun.. but then this debate of Moral Responsibility comes up, and muddles me a bit.
I've been experiencing alot of mental stuff for a while- and through all of this, philosophical questions, existential crises, all of it just comes and never stops.
It's like there's always something for me to worry, or think too...
Recently I asked a question about logic, and the answer directed me to an SEP entry, which then took me to two other SEP entries, on Russell's paradox and on the Liar's paradox.
Frankly, after having read through those explanations, there was a glaring omission from every cited philosopher, and I wondered if everyone was overcomplicating things: I don't see how there is any "paradox" at all.
Consider the concept of a "round square" or a "six-sided pentagon." Those are nonsensical terms, because of the structural nature of the underlying grammar. They are neither logical nor illogical, they are merely grammatically inconsistent at the fundamental level of linguistic definition.
The so-called "paradox" of Russell and the Liar seem to me to be exactly the same kind of nonsensical formulations: the so-called "paradox" is merely a feature of the language, these concepts also are grammatically inconsistent at the fundamental level of linguistic definition. Russell's "paradox" is just as "paradoxical" as...
Do you think that contempt of court through judicial discretion is unjust especially in jurisdictions that allow for jury nullification? Lawyers conduct character assassinations in the witness box all the time, and judges don't always enforce contempt rulings consistently even within the same day. I know character assassinations are something most philosophers and even some lawyers frown upon but as long as that CAN lead to uncovering the truth why not let up to twelve jurors decide for themselves--because judges either don't care or are unable to recognize this (not that they should) why does it matter what the judge thinks and why should lawyers care either? Juries decide serious cases and the role of judges in any just society is merely to enforce procedures, and even then they are not required by law to inform juries of the option of jury nullification and are not required to defend their state-protected deontic legitimacy.